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Appendix 
 
Proposition 1.  
Given complete markets with no arbitrage, the price relationship between yield and 
weight contracts is given by: 
    
qmwcmw − qjmy cjmy = Δcjm ⋅EQ pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ −CovQ yjm , pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . 
 
Proof of Proposition 1.  
The proposition follows from adding and subtracting identical terms and simplifying, by 
factoring out the yield-price covariance, and by substituting the forward price of the crop 
for its risk-adjusted expectation. 
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Proposition 2.  
Assuming risk-averse farmers and system parameters such that contract sales are non-
negative bw* ≥ 0, by* ≥ 0( ) , then: 
Claim 2.1. Positive price-revenue covariance implies farmers may specialize or 
diversify contract offerings. Formally, Cov ym pm* , pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ > 0⇒ by* ∈ 0,1[ ), bw* ≥ 0 . 
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Claim 2.2. Negative price-revenue covariance and positive sales of weight contracts 
can only co-exist if farmers simultaneously oversell yield contracts (above 100%). 
Formally, bw* > 0 ∩ Cov ym pm* , pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < 0⇒ by* >1 . 
Claim 2.3. Except as in Claim 2.2, non-positive price-revenue covariance implies 
zero sales of weight contracts and partial or zero sales of yield contracts. Formally, 
Cov ym pm* , pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ≤ 0 ∩ by* <1⇒ bw* = 0 . 
Claim 2.4. Positive price-revenue covariance implies optimal choices for by*  and bw*  
will diverge in response to changes in the price-revenue covariance. Formally,
∂bw* / ∂Cov ym pm* , pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ > 0  and ∂by* / ∂Cov ym pm* , pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ≤ 0 . Marginal effects of price 
changes are ambiguous without further assumptions. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2.  
Proof of Claims 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 follows directly from examination of the truth table in 
table A1, which shows a “Y” if such a combination of by*,bw*( )  may satisfy the first 
order conditions (Equations 8-12), or an “N” otherwise. For example, we know that 
by* ≠ 1  by contradiction. by* = 1  implies Equation 12 is non-negative, which implies 
bw* = 0 . Then bw* = 0  and by* = 1  together imply Equation 11 is non-negative, which in 
turn implies that by* = 0 , a contradiction.  
Claim 2.2 is an extreme case, essentially involving contract speculation, and the 
level of negative covariance making it possible may not exist given other individual- and 
crop-specific parameters of the problem such as preferences and price-yield dependence. 
Claim 2.4 follows from evaluation of comparative statics with respect to the price-
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revenue covariance, treated as a parameter. Cov ym pm* , pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ > 0  leads to negative off-
diagonal terms in the Hessian matrix arising from the farmer’s expected utility problem. 
Solving for comparative statics via the Implicit Function Theorem yields the result.     !  
 
Proposition 3.  
Assuming diversification means division of the farm into IID crops as described above, 
we compare the choices of diversified farmers against those of mono-crop farmers, all 
else held equal: 
 Claim 3.1. Diversification will cause some farmers to move from an interior 
solution (positive sales) in both contracts to a corner solution (zero sales) in at least one.  
Claim 3.2. Effects of diversification on farmers who maintain an interior solution 
cannot be signed without further assumptions; this includes the extreme case of 
speculation under large negative covariance. 
 Claim 3.3. Diversification will cause farmers with bw* = 0  to double the amount 
held back from yield contracts, 1− by*( ) , or else move from by* ≤ 0.5  to by* = 0 . That is, 
these farmers will have by*  unambiguously decrease. 
 Claim 3.4. Diversification will cause farmers with by* = 0  to decrease the amount 
of weight contracts, bw* , to a new interior solution, or else move to bw* = 0  from 
bw* ≤ 0.25 ⋅Cov yp*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ /Var p*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ . 
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Proof of Proposition 3.  
Claims 3.1, 3.3 and 3.4 follow directly from examination of the first order conditions 
resulting from combining Equations 8-10 and 14-15. The resulting truth table of possible 
parameter combinations satisfying the first order conditions is identical to that in the 
proof of Proposition 2. The defining difference is the scaling of marginal effects on 
variance by a factor of 0.5. Since marginal effects on the mean are unchanged in our 
example, the effect of scaling marginal effects on variance is to require them to double 
(via changing choices, by*  and bw* ) in order to satisfy the necessary first order 
conditions. If we consider the space of all parameters where mono-crop farmers satisfy 
the necessary conditions for an interior choice, then the modified first-order conditions 
are satisfied by strictly fewer of the farmers if they are diversified. Claim 3.2 follows 
from examining the comparative statics effects as in the proof of Proposition 2. Given our 
assumptions, the discrete effect of moving from mono-crop to diversified can be 
decomposed as the integral of marginal effects over a scale factor moving from one to 
0.5, where the scale factor applies to all variances and covariances in farmer’s problem. 
Namely, letting γ  be the scale factor, Equations 11 and 12 become: 
(A2) ∂σ
2
∂by = 1−γ( ) −2 1− b
y( )Var yp*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ + b wCov yp*, p*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( ) , and 
(A3) ∂σ
2
∂bw = 1−γ( ) 2b
wVar p*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ − 1− by( )Cov yp*, p*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( ) , 
where γ = 0  indicates mono-crop production and γ = 0.5  equates to our diversification 
example. With this setup, the discrete changes in a farmer’s optimal choices from one 
interior solution to another can be expressed as the integral over marginal changes with 
respect to the scale parameter, γ : 
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(A4)    Δby* =
0
0.5
∫
∂by*
∂γ
dγ , and Δbw* =
0
0.5
∫
∂bw*
∂γ
dγ . 
Here, we recognize that for interior solutions, ∂2EU / ∂by ∂γ < 0  and ∂2EU / ∂bw ∂γ < 0 . 
If the price-revenue covariance is positive then the inverse Hessian matrix has alternating 
signs, so applying the Implicit Function Theorem leads to indeterminate signs of the 
comparative statics results without further assumptions. The comparative statics also 
have indeterminate signs in the case of interior solutions with extreme negative 
covariance, because the sign of the off-diagonal term in the inverse Hessian matrix is not 
known ex ante.          !   
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Table A1. Possible Contracting Choices as a Function of Covariance. 
 
 Cov ym pm* , pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ > 0  Cov ym pm* , pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ = 0  Cov ym pm* , pm*⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ < 0  
 bw* = 0  bw* > 0  bw* = 0  bw* > 0  bw* = 0  bw* > 0  
by* = 0  Y Y Y N Y N 
by* ∈ 0,1( )  Y Y Y N Y N 
by* = 1  N N N N N N 
by* ≥1  N N N N N Y 
 
 
 
 
